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Article 7

WHY THIRD-PARTY STANDING IN ABORTION
SUITS DESERVES A CLOSER LOOK

Stephen J. Wallace*

INTRODUCTION

Scholarship abounds on the confused and confusing nature of
1
standing law in general, and third-party standing in particular. While
formulations of the general rule flow effortlessly from the pens of
judges and Justices everywhere, 2 contrary results follow just as effort*

Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2009; B.A., History and

Computer Information Science, Franciscan University of Steubenville, 2006. Thanks
to Professor Anthony Bellia and Jordan Lorence for their help and ideas, and to my
wife Meta for her patience and encouragement. This Note is dedicated to Job Tobias
Wallace.
1 See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 129 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(describing the standing doctrine as "a word game played by secret rules"); Raoul
Berger, Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is It a ConstitutionalRequirement?, 78 YALE LJ.
816, 816 (1969) ("Confusion twice-confounded reigns in the area of federal jurisdiction described as 'standing to sue.'"); Abram Chayes, Foreword: Public Law Litigation
and the Burger Court, 96 HARv. L. REv. 4, 22-23 (1982); William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE LJ. 221, 221 (1989) ("The structure of standing law in the
federal courts has long been criticized as incoherent."); Robert Allen Sedler, The
Assertion of ConstitutionalJusTertii: A Substantive Approach, 70 CAL. L. REv. 1308, 1315
(1982) (criticizing the Court's treatment of jus tertii questions as "analytically
unsound").
2 See, e.g., Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410 (1991) ("In the ordinary course, a
litigant must assert his or her own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest a claim to
relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties." (citing U.S. Dep't of Labor v.
Triplett, 494 U.S. 715, 720 (1990))); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 195 n.4 (1976)
("'[O] ne to whom application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack
the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other
persons or other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional."'
(quoting United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21 (1960))); Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S
106, 113 (1976) (plurality opinion) ("Federal courts must hesitate before resolving a
controversy . . .on the basis of the rights of third persons not parties to the litigation."); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255 (1953) ("Ordinarily, one may not claim
standing in this Court to vindicate the constitutional rights of some third party.").
1369

1370

NOTRE

DAME

LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 84:3

lessly only a few pages later.3 Academics have attempted to reconcile
or reconstruct the U.S. Supreme Court's disparate efforts into a
coherent doctrinal framework, 4 but until the Court adopts such
reconceptions or clarifies the doctrine, federal judges and litigators
have to deal with the law as it "stands."'5 This Note aims to help those
judges and lawyers apply standing doctrine correctly in a small but
important area of litigation: suits brought in federal courts by abortion providers and abortion-performing doctors who assert the interests of their patients, often in addition to their own. 6 Courts need to
reexamine their application of standing precedent in this area.
Indeed, if lower courts actually believe what the Court has said, most
3 See, e.g., Powers, 499 U.S. at 416 (allowing a criminal defendant to raise the
rights of jurors excluded from service); Craig, 429 U.S. at 192-97 (allowing a beer
vendor to raise the rights of her male customers); Singleton, 428 U.S. at 114-18 (plurality opinion) (arguing that an abortion provider should be able to assert the rights
of welfare patients to state monies to pay for their abortions); Barrows, 346 U.S. at
257-59 (permitting a white seller to assert the rights of black buyers of land against
racially restrictive covenants).
4 See RicHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 178-80 (5th ed. 2003) (cataloguing various approaches);
Lee A. Albert, Standing to Challenge Administrative Action: An Inadequate Surrogatefor
Claimfor Relief 83 YALE L.J. 425, 464-68 (1974) ("[T]hird-party standing... is often a
decision on whether the litigant in his own right has protected interests derived from
a policy favoring others. As such, it is not preliminary but a decision on the merits of
a litigant's claim."); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As-Applied and Facial Challenges and ThirdParty Standing, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1321, 1331-32 (2000) (recharacterizing many thirdparty rights as first-party claims); LouisJ. Jaffe, Standing to SecureJudicialReview: Private
Actions, 75 HARv. L. REV. 255, 270 (1961) (arguing that the claim that gets the plaintiff
into court "need not be of the same character or dimension as that on which he
ultimately succeeds"); Henry P. Monaghan, Third Party Standing, 84 COLUM. L. REV.
277, 299 (1984) (arguing that third-party standing should be reconceptualized as
presenting first-party claims); Sedler, supra note 1, at 1329 (same); Note, Standing to
Assert ConstitutionalJusTertii, 88 HARv. L. REV. 423, 431-36 (1974) (arguing for a less
restrictive jus tertii regime).
5 Third-party standing is a prudential doctrine and not a constitutional requirement from Article III. See City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 56 n.22 (1998)
(citing Sec'y of State v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 955 (1984)). Congress,
therefore, may change this area of standing law by statute, though there has been
little indication that Congress wants to do so. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 509
(1975); Courtney C. Stirrat, Note, Which One Here Is Not Like the Other? No Third-Party
Standingfor Lawyers to Assert Indigent Criminal Defendants' Right to Counsel on Appeal, 70
Mo. L. REv. 1355, 1362 n.50 (2005).
6 For the sake of simplicity I will refer to this group collectively as "abortion
providers" for the remainder of this Note, as providing abortions and abortion-related
services is the essence of what distinguishes those in that field from similar providers
of health services.

2009]

THIRD-PARTY

STANDING

IN

ABORTION

SUITS

1371

abortion providers should not be able to assert the claims of their
patients.
Part I lays out the current state of standing law in both Article III
and prudential aspects. Part II sketches the history and purpose of
standing law-how this doctrine developed and what purposes it is
supposed to serve. Part III traces the line of relevant jus tertii precedent before Kowalski v. Tesmer7 to determine the state of the law, such
as it was, before that case. Part IV compares Singleton v. Wulff 8 which
is generally (and incorrectly) considered the controlling decision on
abortion provider-jus tertii standing, and Kowalski, a decision that is
more consistent with modern standing doctrine and more applicable
to abortion cases than Singleton. Finally, Part V addresses some practical implications for litigators if Kowalski is adopted as the standard in
abortion standing jurisprudence. If successful, the reader, and perhaps some judges, should see that abortion providers, in the general
case, fail to meet the prudential requirements for asserting the claims
of their patients and should be left, like everyone else, with only their
own rights to "complain" about.
I.

A.

CURRENT STANDING DOCTRINE

Article III Standing Requirements

Standing is a preliminary jurisdictional requirement applied to
every claim in federal court. With it, courts attempt to limit themselves to hearing only the "Cases" and "Controversies" given them by
both Article III of the Constitution and Congress. 9 The Supreme
Court has historically been concerned in this area with whether the
plaintiff has made out an actual "case" or "controversy" between him-

self and the named defendant within the understanding of that article. 10 Article III judicial power exists only to redress or otherwise

protect against injury to the complaining party, and can only be
invoked when the plaintiff himself has suffered some actual or
threatened injury resulting from the putatively illegal action. 1 '

While trying to administer this cryptic mandate, the Court has
formulated three elements as the "irreducible constitutional mini7

543 U.S. 125 (2004).

8

428 U.S. 106 (1976).

9

See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560

(1992).
10 See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 429-30 (1998) (citing Whitmore
v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990)); Warth v.Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975).
11 Warth, 422 U.S. at 499.
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First, there must be an "injury in fact," which is "an invasion

of a legally protected interest." 13 That invaded interest must be "(a)
concrete and particularized, and (b) 'actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.'" 4 Second, "'there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of-the injury
has to be 'fairly... trace [able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not . . .th[e] result [of] the independent action of some

third party.' "15 Third, "it must be 'likely,' as opposed to 'speculative,'
that the injury will be 'redressed by a favorable decision."' 1 6 Stated
succinctly, a federal court must ask whether a plaintiff "has suffered
an injury in fact that is fairly traceable to the defendant's conduct and
7
that is likely to be redressed by a decision in the plaintiffs favor."'
These Article III elements must be satisfied at each stage in the
litigation i8 and the court may raise standing issues sua sponte at any
time or level of appellate review. I9 Furthermore, the "party invoking
federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing" each standing
element. 20 These elements are "an indispensible part of the plaintiffs
case," and must be established to the level of specificity required by
each stage of litigation. 21 Therefore, in the complaint, the plaintiff
must plead "general factual allegations of injury resulting from the
defendant's conduct"; but to survive an opposing summary judgment
motion the plaintiff cannot rest on the "mere allegations" in the complaint, "but must 'set forth' by affidavit or other evidence 'specific
facts"' to prove each part of the standing test.2 2 Finally, at trial the

facts from summary judgment, if not stipulated to, must be "'supported adequately by the evidence adduced at trial."' 23 If at any stage
12 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.
13 Id. (citing Warth, 422 U.S. at 508).
14 Id. (footnote and citations omitted) (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S.
149, 155 (1990)).
15 Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426
U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976)).
16 Id. at 561 (quoting Simon, 426 U.S. at 38, 43).
17 AnthonyJ. BelliaJr., Article Ill and the Cause of Action, 89 IoWA L. REV.777, 779
n.5 (2003).
18 See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561.
19 SeeAdarand Constructors, Inc. v. Mineta, 534 U.S. 103, 110 (2001) (citing Steel
Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 95 (1998)).
20 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561.
21 Id.
22 Id. (quoting FED. R. Cir. P. 56(e)).
23 Id. (quoting Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 115 n.31

(1979)).
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the plaintiff fails to prove these elements, a federal court is bound to
24
dismiss the case.
These procedural requirements-injury in fact, but-for causation
by the defendant, and redressability-serve Article III's fundamental
limitation that the federal judicial power be exercised only "'as a
necessity in the determination of real, earnest and vital controversy.' '' 25 Because these requirements are an "irreducible constitutional minimum, ' 26 a plaintiff's failure to establish them results in a
dismissal.
Finally, it is important to emphasize what the standing inquiry
does not involve. "The fundamental aspect of standing is that it
focuses on the party seeking to get his complaint before a federal
court and not on the issues he wishes to have adjudicated.'27 Standing is
not meant to operate one way when judges andJustices believe a claim
will succeed and another when they believe it will fail. 28 Rather, stand-

ing is "defined as distinct from the fitness of the issue presented for
29
judicial resolution."
B. Jus Tertii Standing8 °
First, some terminology. In third-party suits, the "first party" is
the person who actually files suit. In these cases, that person-the
24 See, e.g., Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 546-47 (1986).
25 Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State,
Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471 (1982) (quoting Chicago & Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v. Wellman,
143 U.S. 339, 345 (1892)).
26 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.
27 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968) (emphasis added).
28 See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975) ("[S]tanding in no way depends
on the merits of the plaintiff's contention that particular conduct is illegal .... "). But
see Fallon, supra note 4, at 1361 n.202 (arguing that in nearly all cases in which the
Supreme Court "has ...

upheld third-party standing[,] .

.

. [an actual or potential

defendant's] claim of third-party rights appeared likely to prevail on the merits").
29 FALLON ET AL., supra note 4, at 128.
30 It is important in the beginning to distinguish third-party standing from
overbreadth. Jus tertii standing is properly restricted to "cases in which the litigants
claim that the application of a law against them will, as one of its natural or intended
consequences, harm the very third parties whose rights the litigants seek to raise." Id.
at 173. Overbreadth challenges, however, "involve both the application of the
challenged law to the claimant and a different, hypothetical application of the law to
third parties." Note, supra note 4, at 424; see also Fallon, supra note 4, at 1326-27
("Facial challenges occur . . . when a party claims that a statute fails an applicable
constitutional test and should ... be deemed invalid in all applications. By contrast,
third-party standing cases arise when one party maintains that a governmental
action . . . simultaneously harms her (the first party) and violates the rights of a

specifically identifiable third-party."); Fletcher, supra note 1, at 244 ("Someone who
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plaintiff-is asserting a right that is not his or her own. The plaintiff
comes as a representative of the party who actually suffered the
alleged wrong. The actual holder of the alleged right in question is
the "third party."
The jus tertii standing inquiry focuses on the plaintiff. It is all
about "who": is the plaintiff the right person to assert this alleged right
in federal court?3' If the plaintiff is not the rightholder, then the general rule is no: a party may assert only his own rights and not those of
32
a third party.
In order to defeat the general rule, whether the plaintiff is assertingjust the third party's claims or his own as well, the plaintiff must
satisfy two "prudential" or 'judge-made" requirements in addition to
the general standing inquiry. 33 The plaintiff must demonstrate some
combination of (1) a "close relationship" between the plaintiff and
the right-holder (third party) and (2) some genuine obstacle or "hindrance" to the right-holder's ability to protect his own interests in
court.3 4 It has been difficult to know whether this test is meant to be
makes an overbreadth challenge to a statute is arguing that a properly drawn statute
could prohibit or regulate the conduct, but that the actual statute at issue is not
properly drawn because it sweeps within its scope conduct that cannot be
forbidden.... A person seeking standing to assert the rights of a third party, on the
other hand, is challenging the application of a statute that is invalid as to her
regardless of how it is drafted, as well as invalid to third parties." (footnote omitted));
Monaghan, supra note 4, at 282 ("[O]verbreadth cases [are those] in which litigants
whose own conduct is not constitutionally protected are nonetheless permitted to
mount a constitutional attack premised on the rights of parties not before the
court ....").Robert Sedler has articulated a good framework for keeping these two
sets of rules in perspective. See Sedler, supra note 1, at 1310-12. It is helpful to keep
this basic distinction in mind while approaching the rules.
31 Sedler, supra note 1, at 1316.
32 See, e.g., Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410 (1991); U.S. Dep't of Labor v.
Triplett, 494 U.S. 715, 720 (1990); Sec'y of State v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S.
947, 955 (1984); Warth, 422 U.S. at 499-500 (citing Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44,
46 (1943)); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610 (1973); United States v. Raines,
362 U.S. 17, 21 (1960); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535-36 (1925); Yazoo &
Miss. Valley R.R. Co. v.Jackson Vinegar Co., 226 U.S. 217, 219-20 (1912).
33 See infra Part II.A.
34 Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 130 (2004) (citing Powers, 499 U.S. at 411).
It is often stated that the jus tertii test has three prongs instead of two, inserting an
"injury in fact" requirement as the first element. See Stirrat, supra note 5, at 1363
(discussing the Powers test and its application by the Kowalski court). This is no longer
a correct statement of the law. The Kowalski court recognized the redundant nature
of the injury in fact question in relation to the constitutional injury in fact question.
The "essential question" in the prudential injury in fact test was whether the "plaintiff
has 'a sufficiently concrete interest in the outcome of [the] suit to make it a case or
controversy.'" Id. at 1365 (alteration in original) (quoting Singleton v. Wulff, 428
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used as a balancing test, a checklist, or as a legal fiction that allows a
court to hide basing its decision on the merits under the cloak of an
35
amorphous standing analysis.

II.

THE HISTORY AND PURPOSES OF STANDING DOCTRINE

A.

History: From Forms of Action to a Civil Action

At common law there was no doctrine of standing as it exists
today.36 Instead, the role that standing plays today was performed by
the basic structure of each lawsuit.3 7 Article III "case" or "controversy"
requirements were essentially a nonissue because the forms of action
at law and requirements in equity defined what was a "case" or "controversy." A federal court could hear a suit if the plaintiff "had a cause
of action for a remedy under one of the forms of proceeding at law or
in equity."3 8 So, if borrower Able refused to pay his debt to lender
U.S. 106, 112 (1976) (plurality opinion)). There is no difference between that and
the Article III inquiry into a concrete injury. See Kowalski, 543 U.S. at 129 ("In this
case, we do not focus on the constitutional minimum of standing, which flows from
Article III's case-or-controversy requirement. Instead, we shall assume the [plaintiffs]
have satisfied Article III and address the alternative threshold question whether they
have standing to raise the rights of others." (citation omitted)).
35 FALLON ET AL., supra note 4, at 176 (arguing that the court has nearly "'always
upheld third-party standing in cases in which [an actual or potential defendant's]
claim of third-party rights appeared likely to prevail on the merits.'" (alteration in
original) (quoting Fallon, supra note 4, at 1361 n.202)); see infra Parts III.A & III.B
(discussing the varying relative importance of each element to the overall inquiry).
36 See Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance,
40 STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1418-19 (1987) (arguing that references to "standing" by
courts in the nineteenth century was often an inquiry into the merits, not the justiciability, of the claim).
37 See Bellia, supra note 17, at 817-18; Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After
Lujan ? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries," and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REv. 163, 170 (1992)
("[W]hat we now consider to be the question of standing was answered by deciding
whether Congress or any other source of law had granted the plaintiff a right to sue.
To have standing, a litigant needed a legal right to bring suit." (footnote omitted)).
This is not, perhaps, the majority scholarly position on this subject, but it is the most
compelling and complete explanation for the doctrine. Alternative opinions can be
found in Berger, supra note 1, at 827 (arguing that standing doctrine arose primarily
from a misunderstanding of the British law ofjusticiability); Fletcher, supra note 1, at
225 (arguing that the growth of the administrative state and an increase in litigation
to enforce public, primarily constitutional, values were the main motivators of the
standing doctrine's development); and Winter, supra note 36 (arguing that standing
law was shaped largely by its power as and growth from a "natural metaphor for when
the court will consider a litigant's claim"). Each of these alternatives, however, fails to
take adequate account of the changes in the judicial system as a result of the Rules
Enabling Act.
38 Bellia, supra note 17, at 817.

1376

NOTRE DAME

LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

84:3

Baker, Baker could only bring an action if he could satisfy the requirements of a specific form of action. Baker could file a writ of assumpsit
for the legal remedy he wanted-forcing Able to pay his debt. Satisfying the requirements of the forms ensured a structural adherence to
the "case" or "controversy" elements of Article III. Baker could only
satisfy the terms of the writ by presenting a personalized injury in fact,
caused by the defendant, and redressible by the court, though not
39
couched in those terms.
Congress abolished the forms of action in 1934 with the Rules
Enabling Act, 40 and with the change the preexisting structural adherence to the "case" or "controversy" requirement was lost. 4 1 Plaintiffs
could bring only one cause of action in the new system, the "civil"
action, which lacked by design the formulaic nature of the old writs.
In order to preserve a federal government of enumerated and not
plenary powers and the federal courts' proper place within that government, limitations emerged that reined in the use of federal judicial
powers. Standing, a 'judicial construct," was brought forward to fill
42
the void.
In the Rules Enabling Act, Congress prohibited the Court from
making the migration to the new "civil" action "in a way that would
affect 'substantive rights' as they existed before the federal merger of
law and equity." 43 The Court was not to "abridge, enlarge, nor modify
the substantive rights of any litigant. '44 If the new Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure allowed a litigant to compel a private person or the
government to comply with any federal law, treaty, or constitutional
provision under the new civil action that was not permitted under the
old forms, then the "substantive rights" of that plaintiff would have
been impermissibly "affected." Without this safeguard, the gains
made in leaving behind the forms of action would be at the cost of a
45
greatly expanded federal judicial power.
Justice Felix Frankfurter is widely credited for introducing standing doctrine 46 in his opinions in Coleman v. Milley,17 and Joint Anti39 See supra Part I.A.
40 Act ofJune 19, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at
28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-2077 (2006)).
41 Bellia, supra note 17, at 855.
42 Berger, supra note 1, at 818.
43 See Bellia, supra note 17, at 855.
44 § 1, 48 Stat. at 1064 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 2072(6)).
45 Bellia, supra note 17, at 856 ("Presumably, [the Rules Enabling Act] meant that
the Court could not conceive of its 'civil action' as a form of proceeding that
increased or decreased the kind of rights that could be enforced pursuant thereto.").
46 FALLON ET AL., supra note 4, at 127 n.3; Bellia, supra note 17, at 857; RobertJ.
Pushaw, Jr., Bridgingthe Enforcement Gap in ConstitutionalLaw: A Critique of the Supreme
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Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath.4 3 According to Professor Raoul
Berger, Justice Frankfurter grounded the concept in Article III:
In endowing the Court with 'judicial Power,"... Article III "presupposed an historic content for that phrase," and in limiting the
sphere ofjudicial action to "Cases" and "Controversies" the Framers
had reference to "the familiar operations of the English judicial system," whereunder "U]udicial power could come into play only in
matters that were the traditional concern of the courts in Westminster and only if they arose in ways that to the expert feel of lawyers
constituted 'Cases' or 'Controversies.' 49
In an argument consistent with this interpretation, Professor
Anthony Bellia has asserted that Justice Frankfurter's approach in
Coleman and Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee was an attempt to distill
the "nature or essence" of what made up the cause of action at law or
equity. This approach is consistent with the limitations in the Rules
Enabling Act and remains the foundation of standing doctrine
50
today.
B.

Purposes of Standing Law

The purposes of standing law include both systemic and institutional values.
Systemic
(1) Separation of powers: preventing the antimajoritarian federal judiciary from usurping the policymaking functions of the
51
popularly elected branches;
Court's Theory that Self-Restraint Promotes Federalism, 46 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1289,
1291-92 (2005) ("In the late 1930s, Franklin Roosevelt's judicial appointees, most
notably Felix Frankfurter, began to develop various 'justiciability' principles to determine the appropriate occasions for the exercise of federal question jurisdiction.
These doctrines rested on the debatable notion that Article III's extension of 'judicial
Power' to 'Cases' and 'Controversies' had always confined the judiciary to adjudicating live disputes between adverse parties with private law interests at stake."); Sunstein, supra note 37, at 179 ("[I]t should come as no surprise that the principal early
architects of what we now consider standing limits were Justices Brandeis and Frankfurter."); Winter, supra note 36, at 1418 ("From those ashes we will see Justice Frankfurter single-handedly raise the phoenix of standing.").
47 307 U.S. 433, 460 (1939) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
48 341 U.S. 123, 149 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
49 Berger, supra note 1, at 816 (second alteration in original) (quoting Coleman,
307 U.S. at 460 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
50 See Bellia, supra note 17, at 857.
51 See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984) ("[T]he 'case or controversy'
requirement defines with respect to the Judicial Branch the idea of separation of
powers on which the Federal Government is founded. The several doctrines that have
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(2) Structural adherence: ensuring as a part of each lawsuit
that the federal courts remain within the bounds of the "cases" and
"controversies" given them in Article III;52
Institutional

(3) Adverseness: ensuring that litigants are truly adverse and
53
therefore likely to present the case effectively;
(4) Ownership: ensuring that the people most directly concerned are able to litigate the questions at issue; 54 and
(5) Concreteness: ensuring that a concrete case informs the
55
court of the consequences of its decisions.
"[T] he law of Art. III standing is built on a single basic idea-the
idea of separation of powers. '5 6 Standing doctrine helps preserve the
separation of powers by narrowing the universe of cases that come
before the judiciary to those that are properly within its constitutional
purview. Standing rules thereby reduce the occasions where the
Court could overturn (or craft) policy which is given by the Constitution to the two elected branches.5 7 Second, the standing rules were
crafted to provide structural adherence to the "cases" and "controver58
sies" requirement in Article III after the merger of law and equity.
Third, "adverseness" tries to ensure that the parties will litigate vigorously and seek the best legal arguments to advance their interests.
The fourth purpose implicates preclusion doctrine: if party A has a
weak attachment to the controversy, but litigates instead of B, who was
directly injured, and loses, B might be precluded from asserting her
claims. Fifth and finally, "concreteness" aids the court in doing what
courts do: deciding particular cases based on the vindication of individual rights. 59 This principle is in tension with the "public rights"
grown up to elaborate that requirement are 'founded in concern about the properand properly limited-role of the courts in a democratic society.' . . . The Art. III
doctrine that requires a litigant to have 'standing' to invoke the power of a federal
court is perhaps the most important of these doctrines." (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422
U.S. 490, 498 (1975))); Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element
of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 881, 894 (1983).
52 See supra Part II.A.
53 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
54 See Warth, 422 U.S. at 498-99.
55 See Baker, 369 U.S. at 204.
56 Allen, 468 U.S. at 752.
57 See Scalia, supra note 51, at 894.
58 See supra Part II.A.
59 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803) ("The province of the
court is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals .... ."); see also Warth, 422 U.S. at
499 ("The Art. III judicial power exists only to redress or otherwise to protect against
injury to the complaining party, even though the court's judgment may benefit others
collaterally.").
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model of constitutional adjudication, whereby the Court "declar[es]
and enforc[es] public norms." 60 Concreteness also helps the court
avoid rendering advisory opinions.
C.

Purposes of Third-Party Standing

Justice Powell summarized the purposes of third-party standing
rules in Warth v. Seldin 61 : "Without [third-party standing] limitations.., the courts would be called upon to decide abstract questions
of wide public significance even though other governmental institutions may be more competent to address the questions and even
though judicial intervention may be unnecessary to protect individual
rights." 6 2 In that statement, Justice Powell highlighted several of the
same general purposes as standing law, including adverseness, concreteness, and the separation of powers. Similarly, the Court in Yazoo
& Mississippi Valley Railroad Co. v. Jackson Vinegar Co. 63 refused to consider the railroad's hypothetical future damages due to "concreteness"
concerns. Yazoo emphasized that a court "must deal with the case in
'6 4
hand and not with imaginary ones.
Besides serving the general systemic goals of standing law, thirdparty standing is also undergirded by its own specific rationales,
namely:
(1) The third party may not wish to assert his rights.
(2) The third party's enjoyment of his rights may remain completely
unaffected by what happens to the litigant.
(3) The court should hear from only the most effective advocate,
who generally will be the third party.
60 Monaghan, supra note 4, at 279-80. There is a rich debate on this topic, and it
cannot be taken up in within the scope of this Note. For treatment of the subject, see,
for example, Richard A. Epstein, SubstantiveDue Process by Any OtherName: The Abortion
Cases, 1973 Sup. CT. REV. 159, 161 ("But in so many areas the Supreme Court today
views constitutional litigation as a means of settling the great conflicts of the social
order. Given its level of aspiration, the 'concreteness' of a factual situation may well
prove to be an embarrassment ....for the details of a case could well reveal narrow
grounds for a decision on the merits."); Owen M. Fiss, Foreword: TheForms ofjustice, 93
HARV. L. REv. 1, 29-30 (1979) ("[T]he function of the judge . . .is not to resolve
disputes, but to give the proper meaning to our public values." (emphasis omitted));
see also infra Part II.D (discussing private versus public rights models).
61 422 U.S. 490.
62 Warth, 422 U.S. at 500; see also infra Part II.D (discussing the public and private
rights models ofjudicial review).
63 226 U.S. 217 (1912).
64 Id. at 219.
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(4) A decision adverse to the litigant who asserts the rights of third
parties will constitute unfavorable precedent that may impair the
65
ability of the third party to assert his own rights later.
Professor Marc Rohr, however, has criticized each presented purpose as unpersuasive. 66 On the first he argues that no one has the
right to not have his or her rights asserted by someone else. 67 Rohr
dismisses the second purpose by arguing that, typically, the third party
would be a real victim who would benefit by a victory for the litigant.
Consequently, the court should not worry about the rare case in which
a plaintiff's claim that survives Article III requirements would not actually affect the interests of the third party. 68 Next, Rohr points out that
Justice Powell's dissent in Singleton considers the third purpose to be
already satisfied by Article III injury in fact requirements. 69 Thus, if a
plaintiff had a sufficient injury in fact, he would be a sufficient advocate in the eyes of the court to bring not only his own claim, but those
of others as well. Finally, Rohr finds the concern about preclusion
unconvincing because third-party member A could not stop thirdparty member B from asserting B's rights despite the bad effects it
might have on A. Therefore, as long as the claimant has a sufficient
interest to provide "concrete adverseness," Rohr argues that the plain70
tiff should be able to press the third-party claim.
Despite these criticisms, each of the presented purposes of jus
tertii standing has merit. If the purpose of the federal judicial power is
the vindication of individual rights, then the wishes of the individual
third party or the collective choices of the class of individual third
parties are important and should be respected. There could be any
number of legitimate reasons why a rightholder would choose not to
65

Marc Rohr, Fightingfor the Rights of Others: The Troubled Law of Third-Party Stand-

ing and Mootness in the Federal Courts, 35 U. MIAMI L. REV. 393, 405 (1981).
66 Id. at 405-06; see also Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 113-14 (1976) (plurality
opinion) ("The reasons are two. First, the courts should not adjudicate such [thirdparty] rights unnecessarily, and it may be that in fact the holders of those rights either
do not wish to assert them, or will be able to enjoy them regardless of whether the incourt litigant is successful or not. Second, third parties themselves usually will be the
best proponents of their own rights. The courts depend on effective advocacy, and
therefore should prefer to construe legal rights only when the most effective advocates of those rights are before them. The holders of the rights may have a like preference, to the extent they will be bound by the courts' decisions under the doctrine of
stare decisis." (citation omitted)).
67 Rohr, supra note 65, at 405.
68 Id. at 405-06.
69 Id. at 406 (citing Singleton, 428 U.S. at 124 n.3 (Powell, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part)).
70 Id.
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assert his rights in a given instance, including bad timing, bad facts, a
balancing against other interests, or even a belief that the right does
not actually exist and should not be claimed. The rightholder may
decide to resolve the situation out of court, without lawyers, or, perhaps, "turn the other cheek" and let the offense pass. 71 Disregarding
the individual and collective choices of a class of rightholders places
the court squarely in the realm of deciding public norms-a role
72
decried by the separation of powers purpose of Article III standing.
Rohr's criticisms of the second purpose similarly fall short due to
the individual nature of federal judicial power and the Court's
expressed desire not to rule on hypothetical claims. 73 If the litigant
wants to assert the claims of a third party who would not receive a
remedy from a court's favorable disposition of the case, then the
plaintiff has essentially asked the court to render an advisory opinion-declaring a right but giving no remedy.74 Rohr's criticism of the
third purpose is generally unpersuasive for the same reasons, but it is
a closer issue. There is an inferential leap between allowing a plaintiff
to assert reasonable arguments in support of his rights and allowing
him to assert the rights of others in support of them.
Finally, Rohr's critique of the fourth purpose of third-party standing falls short because he is comparing apples to oranges. When a
different rightholder presents the right it is simply not the same situation as when a nonrightholder seeks to supplement his claims with the
rights of others. From a global, societal-centric view it may turn out
the same, but when the model for courts is individual case adjudication, who brings a lawsuit is as important as whether it is brought at all.
This draws on the historical understanding of the forms of action and
the mandate of the Rules Enabling Act not to increase the substantive
75
rights of litigants when creating the new "civil" action.
D. A Note on the "PublicRights" Versus "PrivateRights" Models
The debate over judicial review can be broadly characterized as a
choice between a "private rights" and "public rights" model of judicial
action. 76 These two models provide competing justifications for limi71 See Matthew 5:39; Luke 6:29.
72 See supra Part II.B.
73 See, e.g.,
Yazoo & Miss. Valley R.R. Co. v.Jackson Vinegar Co., 226 U.S. 217, 219
(1912).
74 See also Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 516 (2007) ("It is therefore familiar
learning that no justiciable 'controversy' exists when parties . . .ask for an advisory
opinion ....").
75 See supra Part II.A.
76 See FALLON ET AL., supra note 4, at 67-68.
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tations of, and visions for, judicial review. Standing rules powerfully
shape the role of the courts by either allowing or denying access to the
judicial process to broad swaths of plaintiffs (and defendants) 77 and
types of claims. 78 The private rights, or "dispute resolution," 79 model
asserts that the power ofjudicial review comes from, and is limited by,
the power to decide "cases." 80 This model states that: (1) the types of
"cases" justiciable by the federal courts should be restricted to the
types of cases historically decided by courts of law, (2) courts should
generally respect and reinforce the system of separated powers by
refusing to be a "general overseer" of government action, and (3)
judicial review is largely incompatible with democratic self-government and "is tolerable only insofar as necessary to the resolution of
cases." 8 1 This model draws strong support from historical sources surrounding the Founding, the separation of powers, multiple axioms of
constitutional decisionmaking, and the Court's own language in
82
standing cases.
The "public rights" model has emerged in the last half-century,
and it envisions the Court as "an institution with a distinctive capacity
to declare and explicate public values-norms that transcend individual controversies."8 3 In its broadest form, this model would allow any
citizen to bring a civil action against the government for any unlawful
activity, regardless of his stake in the matter. The model grows out of
the twentieth century's increase in governmental regulation, the
explosion of substantive constitutional rights in the Warren Court,
77 See Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 612-22 (1989)
(granting third-party standing to a law firm to assert the fights of its client as a basis
for protecting its own right to payment).
78 Although standing is supposed to be unconcerned with the merits of a particular claim, it is in no way blind to the type of claim or fight asserted. By definition,
standing law rejects any type of claim where there is no injury in fact, direct causation,
or redressability. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). The
determination between the public and private rights models makes a significant difference in the types of "injuries" courts would be willing to accept and a much
broader conception of the power courts have to redress them. Standing law, therefore, while playing a critical role in determining which rights can be vindicated in
federal courts, is itself strongly affected by which model is accepted by the federal
courts.
79 FALLON ET AL., supra note 4, at 67.
80 Id.
81 Id. at 67-68; see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803)
("The province of the Court is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals .....
82 FALLON ET AL., supra note 4, at 67-68, 71.
83 Id. at 68.
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and the conception of constitutional rights as "swords" granting
84
affirmative relief to violations of constitutional rights.
While the Court has never explicitly adopted the public rights
model and has many times spoken in "dispute resolution" language,
both models appear to do some work in justiciability jurisprudence in
general and standing law specifically.8 5 The private rights model,
86
however, has much stronger support in the Court's own language,
and should, arguably, be considered the default position until the
Court says otherwise. Federal courts following this model should
focus on the determination of concrete, individual cases, and not
engage in the broad articulation of public norms. Federal courts
applying standing doctrine should generally refuse claims asking the
courts to declare new public norms and conscientiously require all the
elements of first and third-party standing to be satisfied throughout
the litigation. In this way, courts will help preserve the limits of Article
III authority and the broader system of separated powers.
III.

Jus TERTII

DEVELOPMENTS BEFORE KowALsKI

A plaintiff asserting the rights of a third party must satisfy a court
that (1) there is a "close relationship" between the plaintiff and the
right holder (third party), and (2) that there is some genuine obstacle
or "hindrance" to the right holder's ability to protect his own interests
in court.8 7 This has been a test with shifting standards as the Court
has applied various meanings to a "close relationship" and a "hindrance." This Part outlines the development of the Court's definition
and weight of both elements in a selection of cases- Griswold v. Connecticut,"" Eisenstadt v. Baird,8 9 Craig v. Boren,90 Powers v. Ohio,9 1 and
84 Id. at 69.
85 Id. at 71 ("The Supreme Court has never explicitly embraced the public rights
model of the judicial role or disavowed the dispute resolution model. Indeed, its
formal pronouncements have been consistently to the contrary.").
86 See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984) ("The several doctrines that
have grown up to elaborate [the case or controversy] requirement are 'founded in
concern about the proper-and properly limited-role of the courts in democratic
society."' (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975)); id. at 752 ("These
questions and any others relevant to the standing inquiry must be answered by reference to the Art. III notion that federal courts may exercise power only 'in the last
resort, and as a necessity,' and only when adjudication is 'consistent with a system of
separated powers and [the dispute is one] traditionally thought to be capable of resolution through the judicial process."' (quoting first Chicago & Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v.
Wellman, 143 U.S. 339, 345 (1892), then Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 97 (1968))).
87 See supra Part I.B.
88 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
89 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
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Barrows v. Jackson9 2-leading up to Kowalski. The "relationships"
involved often had little closeness about them, and what "hindrances"
were present, if any, appear to be little more than straw men, unable
to stand up to close scrutiny. These decisions, while leaving the Court
vulnerable to criticisms of having based its standing decisions on outcome, at least illustrate that the Court's rhetoric regarding third-party
standing and its holdings have often been in conflict.
A.

A "Close Relation" Before Kowalski

The "close relation" prong tests whether the first party is an
appropriate proxy for the third party. It comprises two factors: (1) the
nature of the relationship and (2) the alignment of interests between
the third party and the plaintiff.93 In theory, the former ensures that
"the enjoyment of the right is inextricably bound up with the activity
the litigant wishes to pursue. '9 4 The latter examines the interests of
both the first and third parties to determine whether they are the
same, or whether there is an inherent conflict of interest between
them. Such a conflict could prevent the plaintiff from vigorously
presenting the third party's claims, or from presenting them as the
third party would. The cases below demonstrate that, prior to Kowalski, the Court's use of the "relationship" element often lacked the
rigor and seriousness demanded by the Court's own rhetoric on the
important purposes of third-party standing.
Although only two paragraphs long, Griswold's third-party standing analysis demonstrates the lack of rigor and logical consistency
characteristic of results-based decisionmaking. Griswold found that a
doctor had standing to assert the rights of the married people he had
advised on the use of contraceptives. 95 Justice Douglas' majority opinion did not specify the prongs of the third-party inquiry and, indeed,
did not mention "hindrances" as a consideration at all. Instead, Justice Douglas stated that the "professional relationship" between the
doctor, who brought the suit, and the married couple, the third parties, was sufficient to grant jus tertii standing to assert the married
couple's claims. 96 Justice Douglas' own reasoning, however, belies this
assertion. Brushing aside conflicting precedent from Tileston v. UlI90
91
92
93
94
95
96

429 U.S. 190 (1976).
499 U.S. 400 (1991).
346 U.S. 249 (1953).
Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 114-15 (1976) (plurality opinion).
Id. at 114.
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481 (1965).
Id.
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man,9 7 Justice Douglas claimed that concerns about "blurring" the
case or controversy requirements of Article III were "removed" in Griswold because the doctor himself had been charged and convicted as
an accessory for providing the married couple contraceptives in viola-

tion of Connecticut's aiding and abetting statute. 98 "Certainly the
accessory should have standing to assert that the offense which he is
charged with assisting is not, or cannot constitutionally be, a crime." 99
Thus far, the analysis appears to hold that because the plaintiff had
standing to assert his own rights (convicted as an accessory), he may
assert the married couple's rights as well.
Justice Douglas, however, had further support. In an attempt to
give some muscle to the "professional" or "confidential" relationship
he asserted, Justice Douglas cited a series of cases in which the Court
had allowed third-party standing, including Truax v. Raich,100 Pierce v.
Society of Sisters,10 1 and Barrows v. Jackson.10 2 However, only one of the

cited cases, NAACP v. Alabama,l0 3 even arguably involved a "professional" or "confidential" relationship. Concluding that "[t]he rights
of husband and wife ...

are likely to be diluted or adversely affected

unless those rights are considered in a suit involving those who have
this kind of confidential relation to them,"10 4 the Court allowed standing. On the merits Justice Douglas relied almost entirely on the married couple's right to privacy for "intimate relationis]" and the
97 318 U.S. 44, 46 (1943) (per curiam) (holding that a physician seeking a declaratoryjudgment against a statute prohibiting advice on contraceptives had no standing
to assert his patient's right not to be deprived of life without due process of law, even
when pregnancy might endanger the lives of his patients and the physician wished to
advise them on the use of contraceptives).
98 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 480-81 ("Section 54-196 provides: 'Any person who assists,
abets, counsels, causes, hires or commands another to commit any offense may be
prosecuted and punished as if he were the principal offender."' (quoting CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 54-196 (1958 rev.))).
99 Id. at 481.
100 239 U.S. 33, 38-39 (1915) (allowing an employee to assert the rights of a nonparty employer).
101 268 U.S. 510, 535-36 (1925) (allowing the owners of a private school to assert
the rights of nonparty parents of potential pupils).
102 346 U.S. 249, 255-56 (1953) (allowing a white seller who was party to a racially
restrictive covenant to raise the rights of nonparty prospective African American
purchasers).
103 357 U.S. 449, 458-59 (1958) (allowing the NAACP to assert the associational
rights of its members in refusing to provide its membership lists to the court since
forcing them to do so would "result in nullification of the right at the very moment of
its assertion").
104 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 481.
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inviolability of the "sacred precincts of marital bedrooms,"' 0 5 to find
the restriction on the use of contraceptives unconstitutional. 10 6 Without the rights of the married couple to put forward it is still possible
that the doctor would have prevailed, but the opinion would likely
have been far different.
Griswold stands as an example of the Court allowing a party with a
strong Article III standing claim to skirt the rules regarding third-party
standing in order to supplement that party's claim with another that
the Court is sympathetic to on the merits. 10 7 While observers may
agree or not with the opinion's policy choices, circumventing the
standing rules is a disservice to the role of the Court in the constitutional system and violates the separation of powers and structural
adherence purposes of standing law.
The Eisenstadt opinion provides another instructive example. In
Eisenstadt,William Baird was convicted in Massachusetts for lecturing
on contraceptives to students and giving away a package of contraceptive foam to one of them.10 8 The doctor challenged the validity of the
law and asserted the rights of third-party single persons in doing so.
The Court ruled that he had standing to do so, characterizing the
relationship between the doctor and the recipient of the foam as "not
simply that between a distributor and potential distributers, but that
between an advocate of the right of persons to obtain contraceptives
and those desirous of doing so."109 The Court, per Justice Brennan,
examined the "nature of the relationship" of the advocate and
rightholder. Justice Brennan, drawing an analogy to Barrows, found
that the connection "between an advocate of the rights of persons to
obtain contraceptives and those desirous of doing so" was a sufficiently "close relationship."1 0 The majority highlighted this advocacy
by noting that "[t]he very point of Baird's giving away the vaginal
foam was to challenge the Massachusetts statute that limited access to
contraceptives." I'
Relying on the rights of the unmarried third parties, Justice Brennan went on to find that the statute violated the Equal Protection
105
106

Id. at 485.
Id. at 486.

107 For a comparison, see Tileston v. UJlman, 318 U.S. 44, 46 (1943) (per curiam),
which rejected a doctor's third-party standing to challenge the same Connecticut contraception law at issue in Griswold.
108

Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 440 (1972).

109

Id. at 445.

110
111

Id.
Id.
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Clause. 1 12 Once again, the Court granted third-party standing to a
plaintiff who possessed strong Article III standing and whose thirdparty claims were attractive but whose third-party standing appears
shaky against the general rule.
Craig v. Boren further expanded the universe of possible "relationships" by allowing a beer vendor to assert the rights of Oklahoma men
aged eighteen to twenty-one.1 1 3 In Craig, an Oklahoma beer seller
and a man under twenty-one sued to challenge Oklahoma's law establishing a minimum age of eighteen for women and twenty-one for
men to drink beer with 3.2% alcohol content. The young man turned
twenty-one before the case was decided at the Supreme Court, so his
claim was deemed moot. 1 14 That left the beer vendor as the only
party, but she continued to argue the rights of Oklahoma men under
twenty-one under the Equal Protection Clause. 115 This peculiar factual situation influenced the Court's decision:
These prudential objectives, thought to be enhanced by restrictions
on third-party standing, cannot be furthered here, where the lower
court already has entertained the relevant constitutional challenge
and the parties have sought-or at least have never resisted-an
authoritative constitutional determination. In such circumstances,
a decision by us to forgo consideration of the constitutional merits
in order to await the initiation of a new challenge to the statute by
injured third parties would be impermissibly to foster repetitive and
time-consuming litigation under the guise of caution and prudence.
Moreover, insofar as the applicable constitutional questions have
been and continue to be presented vigorously and "cogently," the
denial of jus tertii standing in deference to a direct class suit can
a 6
serve no functional purpose."
Even without this special consideration, however, the Court
would have found jus tertii standing for the beer vendor.1 1 7 Because
she was the target of the legislation, she clearly satisfied Article III
requirements." 8 Relying solely on that Article III standing and Griswold, Justice Brennan declared that the beer vendor was "entitled to
assert those concomitant rights of third parties that would be 'diluted
or adversely affected' should her constitutional challenge fail and the
112

Id. at 454-55.

113

429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).

114
115

Id. at 192.
Id. at 192-93.
116 Id. at 193-94 (citation omitted).
117 Id. at 194 ("In any event, we conclude that appellant Whitener has established
independently her claim to assert jus terii standing.").
118 Id.
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statutes remain in force."1 19 Justice Brennan, leaning on this vendorvendee relationship, found that the law violated the Equal Protection
120
Clause.
In Powers v. Ohio, the Court found another "close relationship,"
this time between a white defendant and the black prospective jurors
who were preemptively struck before his trial.1 21 The Court acknowledged the general rule 122 and the conditions for granting an exception. 123 Justice Kennedy then recognized, at length, Powers' own
Article III standing to challenge racially discriminatory jury practices
both because "racial discrimination in the selection of jurors 'casts
doubt on the integrity of the judicial process,' "124 and because of the
importance of the jury system. 125 Addressing the third-party tests
themselves, Justice Kennedy declared that "[ v] oir dire permits a party
to establish a relation, if not a bond of trust, with the jurors." 126 This
"relation" was "as close as, if not closer than, those [the Court] recog127
nized to convey third-party standing" in Griswold, Craig,and Triplett.
Because of the "bond of trust" formed by the voir dire, the "'litigant
... is fully, or very nearly, as effective a proponent of the right as the
128
[third party].""
Justice Kennedy also addressed possible conflicts of interest
between the defendant and the third party. He found that they had
common interests against racial discrimination in the courtroom, and,
as proving such discrimination could lead to a dismissal for the defendant, Powers was strongly motivated to press the third party's
9

interests.12

119 Id. at 195 (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481 (1965)).
120 Id. at 210.
121 499 U.S. 400, 415 (1991).
122 Id. at 410 ("In the ordinary course, a litigant must assert his or her own legal
rights and interests, and cannot rest a claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of
third parties." (citing U.S. Dep't of Labor v. Triplett, 494 U.S. 715, 720 (1990); Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 115 (1976) (plurality opinion)).
123 Id. at 410-11 ("This fundamental restriction on our authority admits of certain, limited exceptions. We have recognized the right of litigants to bring actions on
behalf of third parties, provided three important criteria are satisfied: The litigant
must have suffered an injury in fact, thus giving him or her a sufficiently concrete
interest in the outcome of the issue in dispute, the litigant must have a close relation
to the third party, and there must exist some hindrance to the third party's ability to
protect his or her own interests." (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
124
125
126

Id. at 411 (quoting Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 556 (1979)).
See id. at 411-13.
Id. at 413.

127

Id.

128

Id. (quoting Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 115 (1976) (plurality opinion)).

129

Id. at 414.
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Reaching the merits of the case, Justice Kennedy relied on the
asserted rights of the excluded black jurors to hold that the Equal
Protection Clause prohibited this activity. 130 Powers, therefore, stands
as another instance of solid Article III standing and a sympathetic
third-party claim overwhelming the jus tertii inquiry.
The "close relationship" prong, therefore, grew to include a number of relationships that were merely legal fictions. In these cases, the
nature of the relationship aspect was often invoked, though further
investigation into the underlying reasoning reveals that the invocation
is unable to bear the weight assigned to it. The alignment of interests
analysis, rarely seen, gave merely a cursory glance to the interests of
both parties, and did not seem to seriously respect possible conflicts of
interest between parties. Whatever the reason, whether it was an
oblique embrace of the public rights model 31 or something else, it
does not appear that the Court made its decisions based on the closeness of the relationship between the first and third parties, if any relationship ever even existed. Rather, these decisions were driven by the
strength of the first party's own Article III standing, the sympathetic
nature of the third-party claims, and the party's likely success on the
merits. As explained below,1 32 this weakness in the Court's doctrine
has been corrected by Kowalski.
B.

"Genuine Obstacle" or "Hindrance"Before Kowalski

The second prong of the jus tertii analysis is the "genuine obstacle" or "hindrance" prong. It focuses on any obstacles to the third
party asserting her own rights and her ability to do so. It has been
difficult to determine if the Court will take this requirement seriously
from case to case, as it has, on various occasions, not mentioned it,
ignored it, considered it with other factors, and, seemingly, allowed it
to control the result. There has also been a spectrum of results on
how burdensome a "hindrance" is required. Whether an absolute bar
or a slight inconvenience is sufficient has depended on the case. This
subpart traces both of these spectra through a few representative cases
to demonstrate the state of the hindrance prong before Kowalski. As
with the close relationship standard, the Court's application of the
hindrance test was not a model of fidelity to the purposes of standing.
130 Id. at 409 ("We hold that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits a prosecutor
from using the State's peremptory challenges to exclude otherwise qualified and
unbiased persons from the petit jury solely by reason of their race .
131 See supra Part II.D.
132 See infra Part IV.B.

.
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In Barrows v. Jackson, the Court laid down a high standard for the
hindrance element: "It would be difficult if not impossible for the persons whose rights are asserted to present their grievance before any
court." 1 33 The white homeowner in the case was sued for breaching a

racially restrictive covenant (of the kind declared unconstitutional in
Shelley v. Kraemer 34 ) when the homeowner sold the house to a black
family. Because the black family was a party to neither the contract
nor the suit, it was prevented from asserting its own rights. The homeowner had jus tertii standing to add the claims of black prospective
purchasers to his own because he was "the only effective adversary of
the unworthy covenant in its last stand."1 3 5 Barrows protection of societal values proved to be more influential than its strong hindrance
language.
The unmarried recipients of contraceptives in Eisenstadtwere not
subject to prosecution (as recipients) under the law denying access to
contraceptives in Massachusetts. Because of the resultant difficulty in
challenging this statute, the Court found that Baird's jus tertii claim
was even stronger than the doctor's in Griswold, where the married
couple themselves might be subject to prosecution as users. 136 The
unmarried persons in Eisenstadt were "denied a forum in which to
assert their own rights," and this "advocate," who gave away the contraceptive foam for the sole purpose of challenging the statute, therefore
13 7
had standing to assert their rights along with his own.
The hindrance present, according to Justice Brennan, was the difficulty for the single persons to bring a suit when they were not subject
133 346 U.S. 249, 257 (1953) (emphasis added).
134 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948).
135 Barrows, 346 U.S. at 259.
136 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 446 (1972); see also Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 480 (1965) (quoting the Connecticut statute that allowed prosecution
of both users and providers of contraceptives). It is noteworthy that the Griswold
Court did not even consider the clear lack of legal hindrances that would have prevented married couples from bringing their own claims as a factor in its decision to
grant third-party standing to the doctor. See Stirrat, supranote 5, at 1370 n .111 (citing
Griswold and Pierce as cases where the Court did not require the plaintiffs to establish
that the third-parties could not assert their own claims).
137 Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 446. The Court has also allowed jus terii standing when
the very assertion of the right by the third party would render the right a nullity. In
NAACP, the association refused to provide its membership lists in the face of a contempt order from the state court. Instead, it asserted the right of its members to free
association and the Supreme Court recognized its standing to do so. Requiring that
the ight be claimed by the individual members themselves "would result in nullification of the right at the very moment of its assertion." NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S.
449, 458-59 (1958); see also Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 711-12 (1987) (allowing
deceased parents' ights to be asserted by their children).
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to prosecution themselves.1 38 This is clearly not, however, the "absolute bar" Barrows described. Ruling on the basis of the third-party
rights, the majority found that the law violated the Fourteenth
Amendment. If the unmarried persons had come as plaintiffs, they
could have, at least arguably, satisfied Article III standing themselves.
They had an injury in fact in the unavailability of contraceptives in
Massachusetts and whatever harmful effects that could be alleged to
be attributed thereto. That injury was directly traceable to the statute,
and it was redressable by the type of opinion the Court gave anyway.
Eisenstadt, then, stands as a more permissive standard on the hin1 39
drance spectrum than Barrows.
Another variant on the hindrance spectrum focuses on "the likeli140
hood and ability of the third parties ... to assert their own rights."
In Powers, the Court took a more "realistic" view of the hindrance
prong. The Court granted third-party standing to Powers largely
because "It]he barriers to a suit by an excluded juror are daunting." 141 While persons in the jury pool had the right to bring suit on
their own behalf when excluded because of race, such suits were rare
because of several disincentives. Potential jurors were not parties to
the suit in question and were therefore unable to challenge their
exclusion during the trial. 142 There were also difficulties of proof and
the potentially large cost of litigating a suit the juror may have had
little interest in. 143 These realistic hindrances formed "considerable
practical barriers to suit."' 44 "The reality is that a juror dismissed
because of race probably will leave the courtroom possessing little
incentive to set in motion the arduous process needed to vindicate his
own rights."'1 45 This "reality" was sufficient to satisfy the hindrance
prong for the Powers court. The Court's determination on practical
grounds that the suit would never otherwise be brought and its willingness to delve into circumstances that may or may not surround
138

This recalls the debate over public versus private fights models. See supra Part

II.D. While the private rights model would require such rights to be vindicated

through political action in the legislature or the third party's own suit, the public
rights model finds the Courts to be a suitable forum for such fights to be upheld.
139 See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 196-97 (1976) (citing Eisenstadt as controlling
authority while granting third-party standing to a beer vendor to assert the rights of
Oklahoma men aged eighteen to twenty-one).
140 Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 414 (1991).
141 Id.
142 See id.
143 See id. at 415.
144 Id.
145 Id.
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such a juror make this decision an even more permissive understanding of the hindrance prong than Eisenstadt.
Craig is even further along the permissive end of the spectrum.
The Court in Craig allowed a beer vendor to assert the rights of all
Oklahoma men aged eighteen to twenty-one. 146 It did so despite the
Court's explicit admission that "'a class could be assembled, whose
fluid membership always included some [Oklahoma males] with live
claims.' "147 In fact, this case only came to the Court because an
Oklahoma man between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one was a
party and then turned twenty-two before the suit came to the Court.
The Court brushed that fact aside, arguing that such a class would
itself be essentially "representative" in nature, and there was not an
important difference between this beer vendor representing
Oklahoma men and a class of such men doing so themselves. 148 By
granting jus tertii standing in a situation where only ordinary coordination and litigation problems existed 149 and where a member of the
class was previously a party, the Court pushed the hindrance prong to
its furthest extreme.
This sample of cases involving the hindrance prong paints a picture of third-party standing similar to that seen in the close relationship context. By granting standing to assert third-party rights to
plaintiffs in situations where far less than an absolute bar stood
between the third-parties and asserting their own rights for themselves, the Court distanced its holdings from the purposes of standing
law: adverseness, ownership, concreteness, separation of powers, and
structural adherence. Instead, third-party standing became a vehicle
for plaintiffs who had compelling Article III standing and a claim the
Court was sympathetic to on its merits to bring their cases before the
Court.
IV.

SINGLETON VERSUS

KowALsi

With these cases in mind, this Part turns to the specific context of
claims brought by abortion providers seeking third-party status to
assert the rights of their patients in addition to their own. While Singleton v. Wulff has been read by many lower courts to control the disposition of such cases, that conclusion is belied by a close reading of
146 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
147 Id. at 194 (quoting Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 117-18 (1976) (plurality
opinion)).
148

See id.

149 For example, in Craig the problems were assembling a rotating class and paying for the expenses of a lawsuit.
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the case itself.' 50 On its own terms, Singleton does not control the
disposition of this issue in the vast majority of these cases. Furthermore, the change in the Court's jurisprudence on third-party standing
in Kowalski has significantly affected the landscape of jus tertii standing. Singleton should not have controlled these cases before Kowalski
was decided, and most decidedly should not control them afterward.
This Part describes both cases and the jus tertii holding in each. It
then applies the new Kowalski rubric to the facts in Singleton to
demonstrate the change in methodology Kowalski wrought. This Part
concludes by cataloguing the changes in jus tertii law from Kowalski.
A.

The Myth of Singleton

Many lower courts have applied Singleton in suits where abortion
providers seek to assert the rights of their patients as if the case
decides the issue. 151 It does not. Other courts, recognizing Singleton's
weakness as a plurality opinion, have nonetheless followed nearly
identical reasoning to reach the same result. 152 A close inspection of
the opinion, however, shows that it was a narrow decision by a Court
sharply divided (4-1-4) on the very issue of third-party standing. This
subpart examines the factual situation in and legal reasoning of the
case and argues that Singleton should be read narrowly to apply only to
its specific facts.
Singleton's facts and procedural posture are straightforward. A
Missouri statute restricted Medicare funding such that it "'shall not
150 See Aid for Women v. Foulston, 441 F.3d 1101, 1112 n.13 (10th Cir. 2006)
("Singleton's discussion of third-party standing was joined only by a four-member plurality.... Many cases nonetheless speak of the court in Singleton as having "held" that
the physician had third-party standing.").
151 See, e.g., Okpalobi v. Foster, 190 F.3d 337, 350-53 (5th Cir. 1999) (granting
third-party standing rights to abortion provider because in Griswold and Singleton
"[t]he Supreme Court ... has carved out an exception to [the general third-party
standing] rule in the context of physicians claiming to assert their patients' rights to a
pre-viability abortion"); Volunteer Med. Clinic, Inc. v. Operation Rescue, 948 F.2d
218, 223 (6th Cir. 1991) ("We rested our analysis in Planned Parenthood largely on
[Singleton], where the Supreme Court held that, given the nature of the right
involved, 'it generally is appropriate to allow a physician to assert the rights of women
patients as against governmental interference with the abortion decision." (citation
omitted)); N.Y. State Nat'l Org. for Women v. Terry, 886 F.2d 1339, 1347-48 (2nd
Cir. 1989) (citing Singleton with no discussion of third-party standing test); Planned
Parenthood Ass'n of Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 822 F.2d 1390, 1394, 1396
(6th Cir. 1987) (following Singleton's "holding" to allow operator of abortion clinic to
assert the rights of its patients against a city fetal disposal ordinance); Women's Med.
Ctr. of Providence, Inc. v. Roberts, 512 F. Supp. 316, 319 (D.R.I. 1981) (summary
citation allowing jus tertii standing).
152 See Aid for Women,441 F.3d at 1111-14.
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include abortions unless such abortions are medically indicated.' 1 53
Two Missouri-licensed abortion providers filed suit in federal district
court seeking an injunction against the statute and a declaration that
it was invalid both on its face and as applied to them. Each claimed
that they had performed abortions for welfare patients eligible for
Medicaid funding, planned to do so in the future, and that all their
requests for reimbursement from the state program had been denied
by the defendant, the state official responsible. 154 Furthermore, they
alleged that these refusals to pay them for doing these abortions
"chill[ed] and thwart[ed] the ordinary and customary functioning of
the doctor-patient relationship."' 15 5 The abortion providers' claims
15 6
were grounded in vagueness, equal protection, and privacy rights.
The district court dismissed the case for lack of standing. The
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed on standing and went
on to reach the merits, holding the statute "obviously unconstitutional."' 157 The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Eighth
Circuit, finding that, while it had jurisdiction, the court should not
158
have reached the merits of the case.
The Court's holding on standing was razor-thin and unremarkable: the doctors had Article III standing because their economic
interest in the outcome gave them an injury in fact. 159 That was the
extent of the majority holding on standing in Singleton. On the issue
of third-party standing the Court split, with Justice Blackmun writing
for the four-member plurality and Justice Powell writing for the four153

Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 108-09 (1976) (plurality opinion) (quoting

Mo. REV. STAT. § 208.152 (Supp. 1975)).
154 Id. at 109.
155 Id. at 110.
156

See id. ("A number of grounds were stated, among them that the statute, 'on its

face and as applied,' is unconstitutionally vague, '[d]eprives plaintiffs of their right to
practice medicine according to the highest standards of medical practice'; '[d]eprives
plaintiffs' patients of the fundamental right of a woman to determine for herself
whether to bear children'; '[i]nfringes upon plaintiffs' right to render and their
patients' right to receive safe and adequate medical advice and treatment'; and
'[d]eprives plaintiffs and their patients, each in their own classification, of the equal
protection of the laws.'" (alterations in original)).
157 Id. at 112 (quoting Wulff v. Singleton, 508 F.2d 1211, 1215 (8th Cir. 1974)).
158 See id. at 119 ("On this record, we do not agree, however, with the action of the
Court of Appeals in proceeding beyond the issue of standing to a resolution of the
merits of the case.").
159 See id. at 113 ("If the physicians prevail in their suit to remove this limitation,
they will benefit, for they will then receive payment for the abortions. The State (and
Federal Government) will be out of pocket by the amount of the payments. The
relationship between the parties is classically adverse, and there clearly exists between
them a case or controversy in the constitutional sense.").
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member dissent, 160 while Justice Stevens' concurrence in part did not
61
join Justice Blackmun's jus tertii analysis.1
Justice Blackmun began the plurality's analysis with a statement
of the general rule and capably articulated the reasons for it.
First, the courts should not adjudicate such rights unnecessarily,
and it may be that in fact the holders of those rights either do not
wish to assert them, or will be able to enjoy them regardless of
whether the in-court litigant is successful or not. Second, third parties themselves usually will be the best proponents of their own
rights. The courts depend on effective advocacy, and therefore
should prefer to construe legal rights only when the most effective
advocates of those rights are before them. The holders of the rights
bound by the
may have a like preference, to the extent they will be
16 2
courts' decisions under the doctrine of stare dec/sis.
He then laid out the conditions that indicated an exception should be
granted. The Court, he said, had looked in the past to two elements:
(1) the relationship between the plaintiff and the third party and (2)
"the ability of the third party to assert his own right."' 63 Blackmun
explained the relationship prong: "[i]f the enjoyment of the right is
inextricably bound up with the activity the litigant wishes to pursue,"
the court can be sure the "construction of the [third party's] right is
not unnecessary."1 64 Also, the relationship "may be such that the [litigant] is fully, or very nearly, as effective a proponent of the right as

160 See id. at 122-31 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
161 See id. at 122 (Stevens, J., concurring in part) (refusing to join Justice Blackmun's jus tertii analysis).
162 Id. at 113-14 (plurality opinion) (citation omitted); see also supra Part II.B (discussing the purposes of the general rule).
163 Singleton, 428 U.S. at 115-16 (plurality opinion).
164 Id. at 114-15; see also Rohr, supra note 65, at 413 ("[I]s Mr.Justice Blackmun's
statement about the necessity of adjudication any different from requiring simply that
there be a real ... victim of the allegedly unlawful conflict?"). Furthermore, there is
reason to doubt that any real doctor-patient relationship existed here. Justice Powell's dissent criticized the "ease with which the plurality would allow assertion of such
standing... based on nothing more substantial than a professional (orperhaps only an
abortion clinic) relationship .... " Singleton, 428 U.S. at 130 n.7 (Powell, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added). This could be explained by the
procedural posture of the case, as the Court reviewing a motion to dismiss will take all
the plaintiffs claims as true, but it raises interesting questions: How much "doctoring"
needs to be done before a doctor-patient relationship sufficient for the purposes of
jus tertii is established? Does a brief abortion procedure, set up in advance by a clinic
worker, suffice?
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the [third party]."165 He then cited Griswold, Eisenstadt, Barrows, and
7

16
Doe v. Bolton 1 66 as supporting authority.
On the hindrance prong, the plurality stated:

Even where the relationship is close, the reasonsfor requiringpersons to
assert their own rights will generally still apply. If there is some genuine

obstacle to such assertion, however, the third party's absence from
court loses its tendency to suggest that his right is not truly at stake,
or truly important to him, and the party who is in court becomes by
168
default the right's best available proponent.
Applying this test to the facts, Justice Blackmun found two obstacles to
a woman bringing her own claim: (1) protecting the privacy of her
abortion from publicity in a lawsuit; and (2) because of the "imminent
mootness" of any individual woman's claim, as her pregnancy will end
169
long before her suit is over.
Neither of these obstacles is a "genuine obstacle," as the plurality
itself recognizes. "It is true that these obstacles are not insurmountable," Justice Blackmun concedes, as women have frequently brought
similar suits under pseudonyms 170 and women who were pregnant but
are no longer with child "retain the right to litigate the point because
it is 'capable of repetition yet evading review." 17 1 Despite the apparent ease with which these hindrances can be overcome, Justice Blackmun maintained that "if the assertion of the right is to be
165 Singleton, 428 U.S. at 114-15 (plurality opinion).
166 410 U.S. 179 (1973). Professor Rohr notes that the reference to Doeis "rather
surprising" given the differences in the facts of the case and the complete lack of any
third-party standing discussion in the case. Rohr, supra note 65, at 413 n.89.
167 See supra Part III.B for a discussion of the weaknesses of the "close relationship" prong in Griswold and Eisenstadt.
168 Singleton, 428 U.S. at 116 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added). Justice Blackmun relied on Eisenstadt, NAACP, and Barrows for this proposition. See also supra
Part II.B.3 for a discussion of the hindrance decisions in Eisenstadt and Barrows.
These decisions required a far more substantial obstacle to the third party bringing
his or her own claim than the plurality does in Singleton. See Singleton, 428 U.S. at 126
(Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that the NAACP, Barrows, and Eisenstadt hindrances were far more difficult to overcome than those
asserted as satisfactory by the plurality).
169 Singleton, 428 U.S. at 126 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
170 Id. at 117 (plurality opinion); see also, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 124
(1973) (allowing the use of a pseudonym); Doe, 410 U.S. at 184 (same). But cf
Epstein, supra note 60, at 161 ("[T]he abortion cases leave the distinct, if undocumented, impression that the nameless plaintiffs were parties to the case only because
the persons and organizations that wished to overturn the abortion statutes sought
them out as a means to mount their challenge.").
171 Singleton, 428 U.S. at 117 (plurality opinion) (quoting Roe, 410 U.S. at 124-25).
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'representative' to such an extent anyway, there seems little loss in
terms of effective advocacy from allowing its assertion by a physician.' 72 Therefore, "it generally is appropriate to allow a physician to
assert the rights of women patients as against governmental interference with the abortion decision."1 73 This dicta ignores the basic distinction that the woman would have brought suit as a first party, and
would not be "representative" in any real way. It is her own current or
future rights at stake, not those of third parties.
Despite a strong recitation of the purposes of standing law, the
Singleton plurality found, as the majorities did in Eisenstadt, Griswold,
Craig,and Powers, that third-party standing was appropriate. Justice
Blackmun came to this conclusion even though there was no evidence
of any close relationship existing between the abortion providers and
their current or future patients. Furthermore,Justice Blackmun ruled
contrary to his own explanation of the hindrance prong. The plurality stated that the general rule of no third-party standing would apply,
even if there was a close relationship, if there were no "genuine obstacles." Justice Blackmun was, however, unable to articulate a hindrance or obstacle for which the Court itself had not already provided
a solution. With no hindrances to stand on, it is no surprise that five
members of the Court refused to endorse this portion of the opinion.
Aside from the flaws in the plurality's argument, however, there
are a few practical points that deserve emphasis. First, the sweeping
general statement of open jus tertii standing for all abortion providers
of all female patients is beyond Singleton's facts. Second, the entire
discussion comes from a plurality opinion, was not a holding of the
Court, and was the subject of a vigorous dissent by Justice Powell and
three other Justices.1 74 Third and finally, the sweeping general statement of abortion provider standing and the specific applications of
law to fact have never been adopted by a majority of the court. 175 Sin172

Singleton, 428 U.S. at 117-18 (plurality opinion). The suit would be "represen-

tative" because a woman who was no longer pregnant would be arguing the side of
pregnant women.
173 Id. at 118.
174 See id. at 122-31 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
175 Portions of the plurality have been cited in majority opinions, but no majority
has adopted the Singleton plurality's specific law-to-facts arguments or the statement of
abortion provider standing. See Domino's Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald, 546 U.S. 470, 479
(2006) (citing general purposes of jus tertii doctrine); Campbell v. Louisiana, 523 U.S.
392, 397 (1998) (citing the three-part jus tertii test in general terms only); Powers v.
Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410, 413-14 (1991) (citing three-part test); Whitmore v. Arkansas,

495 U.S. 149, 156 (1990) (citing Article III requirements); Caplin & Drysdale,
Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 623 (1989) (citing standing prong, relationship test); Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 711 (1987) (citing Article III requirements);
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gleton should be taken not as a strong precedential decision on thirdparty standing, but rather as a limited holding on Article III standing
requirements. Even if the plurality's opinion were adopted as binding
precedent, the jus tertii holding can easily be distinguished on the
facts of the case-an abortion provider asserting his own right to get
paid and the right of his patient for medical coverage of an abortion
176
that has already taken place.
Based on Singleton's own facts and circumstances, besides the
weakness of the jus tertii analysis from the plurality, this case should
not control current abortion provider jus tertii decisions. A plurality
opinion, strongly opposed or questioned by five members of the
Court, whose underlying rationale is open to sharp criticism, is not a
precedent that should be applied blindly into the future. Instead,
Kowalski provides a better vision of third-party standing for the lower
courts to adopt.
B. Kowalski
In Kowalski v. Tesmer, the Court returned to a serious application
of jus tertii standing principles. Kowalski separated out the Article III
standing issue and proceeded to apply the close relationship and hindrance prongs with rigor equal to the language of the general rule.
Focusing on the actual and not abstract nature of the "relationship,"
the Court found "no relationship at all" between the attorneys and the
hypothetical indigent defendants. 177 Similarly, the burden to indigent appellants having to bring their appeals pro se was not enough to
amount to a hindrance because of the practical experience of such
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 804 (1985) (citing general prudential
rule); Sec'y of State v.Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 954 (1984) (citing Article
III requirements); South Carolina v. Regan, 465 U.S. 367, 380 (1984) (citing general
rule that third-party standing is the exception rather than the rule); Valley Forge
Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, 454 U.S. 464, 474
(1982) (citing general prudential rule and purposes); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128,
133 (1978) (discussing Article III standing requirements in relation to Fourth Amendment rights); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 80 (1978)
(citing prudential reasons to limit extensions of third-party standing); Craig v. Boren,
429 U.S. 190, 193-94 (1976) (citing Powell's dissent, Article III holding, and hindrance requirement).
176 Even this "holding" would be on shaky ground today, since it has since been
held that women are not entitled to state money to pay for their abortions. See, e.g.,
Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 508-13 (1989) (holding that a state
refusing to fund abortions does not violate Roe v. Wade); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S.
297, 325 (1980) (upholding the most restrictive version of the Hyde Amendment,
Pub. L. No. 96-123, § 109, 93 Stat. 923, 926 (1979)).
177 Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 130 (2004).
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pro se appellants succeeding in similar cases. 17 8 The Court ruled
against jus tertii standing despite the fact that it would uphold the substantive claims of these indigent defendants in another case that very
Term. 179 Kowalski, therefore, represents a striking departure from the
previous practices of (1) allowing a strong Article III claim to prop up
a weak jus tertii claim and (2) granting third-party standing if the
"underlying claim of third-party rights would appear to be substantively meritorious."' 8 0 Both of these changes represent a return to the
black-letter principles of jus tertii law and the more fundamental purposes of standing law.
Kowalski involved a "constitutional challenge to Michigan's procedure for appointing appellate counsel for indigent defendants who
plead guilty."' 8" Two attorneys, claiming to represent future unrepresented indigent defendants, brought the suit based on third-party
standing to challenge this practice. A 1994 amendment to the Michigan constitution eliminated the "as of right" appeal for criminal
defendants who pled guilty or nolo contendere. Instead, any appeal
would be "'by leave of the court"' only. 8 2 Judges began to deny
court-appointed counsel for such defendants and the legislature codified the practice soon afterwards. Barring a few exceptions, the statute prohibited appointing appellate counsel for the poor who plead
83
guilty.'
A month before the law took effect, three poor criminal defendants and two lawyers filed suit in federal district court to enjoin the
practice, naming the Michigan Attorney General and three Michigan
judges as defendants and claiming violation of their due process and
equal protection rights. 1 84 The district court held the statute unconstitutional. 18 5 Although the Sixth Circuit initially reversed, 18 6 the
panel's decision was subsequently reversed by the Sixth Circuit en
banc. 1 8 7 Both the Sixth Circuit panel and the court en banc found
that the attorneys had standing to assert the claims of the indigent
178 Id. at 132.
179 See Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605, 610 (2005) (holding that the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses require appointment of counsel for indigent
defendants seeking access to first-tier review in the Michigan Court of Appeals).
180 FALLON ET AL., supra note 4, at 17 (5th ed. Supp. 2008) (arguing that Kowalski
represents a "clear departure" from the practice).
181 Kowalski, 543 U.S. at 127.
182 Id. (quoting MICH. CONST. art. I, § 20).
183 See id. at 128; Stirrat, supra note 5, at 1357.
184 Stirrat, supra note 5, at 1358.
185 Tesmer v. Kowalski, 114 F. Supp. 2d 622 (E.D. Mich. 2000).
186 Tesmer v. Granholm, 295 F.3d 536 (6th Cir. 2002).
187 Tesmer v. Granholm, 333 F.3d 683 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
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defendants, which had been dismissed due to abstention doctrine
concerns.18 8 The Supreme Court, in a 6-3 decision written by Chief
Justice Rehnquist, reversed and remanded, finding that the lawyers
did not have jus tertii standing.
Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion began by assuming
that the lawyers had Article III standing and laying out the general jus
tertii rule. 8 9 He explained that parties must rely on their own rights
and not "'on the legal rights or interests of third parties."' 190 This
rule ensured the "necessary zeal and appropriate presentation" of
claims and helped the court to avoid being "'called upon to decide
abstract questions of wide public significance .. even though judicial
' 91
intervention may be unnecessary to protect individual rights.""
Chief Justice Rehnquist then framed the analysis for exceptions: the
party must show (1) a "close relationship" between the litigant and the
rightholder and (2) a "hindrance" to the rightholder's ability to protect his own interests.1 92 After recognizing that a class of exceptions
has existed where the "'Court has allowed standing to litigate the
rights of third parties when enforcement of the challenged restriction
against the litigantwould result indirectly in the violation of third par193
ties' rights,"' the Court turned to the two required prongs.
The ChiefJustice's opinion focused on the hypothetical nature of
the "relationship" between the lawyers and their prospective indigent
clients. The opinion distinguished the existing lawyer-client relationships in Caplin & Drysdale, Charteredv. United States'9 4 and United States
Department of Labor v. Triplett,195 cases where the Court allowed law
firms third-party standing to assert the interests of their existing clients. The Kowalski plaintiffs, however, did "not have a 'close relationship' with their alleged 'clients'; indeed, they ha[d] no relationship at
all." 196 In Caplin and Triplett, the law firms were representing actual

clients, existing persons with whom they had established relationships.
Unlike the Kowalski plaintiffs, they were not merely resting on an
188 Kowalski, 543 U.S. at 128.
189 See id. at 129. The lawyers' injury in fact was the future loss of revenue from
defending these types of clients, which was assumed without deciding whether it was
enough to sustain Article III standing. Id. at 129 n.2.
190 Id. at 129 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975)).
191 Id.(quoting Warth, 422 U.S. at 500).
192 Id. at 130 (citing Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 411 (1991)).
193 Id. (quoting Warth, 422 U.S. at 500).

194

491 U.S. 617 (1989).

195
196

494 U.S. 715 (1990).
Kowalski, 543 U.S. at 131.
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abstraction of the attorney-client relationship with hypothetical future
claimants.
Turning to the hindrance prong, the Court took notice that the
indigent defendants could challenge the denial of counsel themselves
pro se in the Michigan court of appeals, the Michigan Supreme Court,
197
and on writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court of the United States.
The plaintiffs argued vigorously that the indigent defendants would
be unable to satisfy the procedural requirements without counsel's
assistance. Chief Justice Rehnquist, however, noted that "[t]hat
hypothesis . . . was disproved" by judicial experience.19 8 He high-

lighted two cases in which pro se plaintiffs took appeals of the debated
system to the Michigan Supreme Court and another that reached the
U.S. Supreme Court. 19 9 Each of those cases were brought by indigent
appellants without the assistance of counsel. Despite the fact that the
attorney's assistance would be "valuable," the majority found that it
20 0
was not a sufficient hindrance to grant third-party standing.
Furthermore, the plaintiffs failed to satisfy the hindrance prong
on an independent ground. The Chief Justice expressed a concern
that this § 1983 claim was filed in federal court because "the attorneys
and the three indigent plaintiffs . . .did not want to allow the state

process to take its course." 20 ' While the three indigent plaintiffs were
properly dismissed below on Younger doctrine 20 2 grounds, granting
the attorney's third-party standing would allow them to "circumvent[]" the Younger doctrine and use "a federal court to short circuit
the State's adjudication of this constitutional question."2 0 3 Concern
for the federal scheme, therefore, provided an "additional reason to
'20 4
deny the attorneys third-party standing.
Justice Ginsburg, writing for herself and two other Justices,
argued in dissent that the threat of economic loss alone was enough
to satisfy third-party standing requirements and protested the distinction between hypothetical and existing relationships when the Court
197

See id.

198 Id. at 132.
199 See id.
200 See id. at 132-33.
201 Id.
202 See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 53-54 (1971) (preventing a state criminal
defendant from asserting ancillary challenges to ongoing state criminal procedures in
federal court).
203 Kowalski, 543 U.S. at 133.

204 Id. Justice Thomas authored a short concurring opinion as well as joining the
majority. He stated a desire to reexamine the precedent allowing such frequent use
of third-party standing, largely with an eye towards voting much of the doctrine off
the constitutional island. See id. at 134-36 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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had previously allowed something as simple as a buyer-seller connection to suffice in the past. 20 5 She also emphasized the difficulties
faced by the indigent defendants, claiming that the barriers are high
enough to pass even a hindrance test "with more starch" than that
20
used in many previous decisions.

6

Thus, Kowalski standing doctrine marked a significant departure
from the prior trends in third-party standing law in three ways. First,
the test was articulated as two necessary elements instead of three possible factors of unknown and changing necessity. This reduces the
redundancy of dealing with the Article III standing question twice and
should reduce the window of opportunity for litigators and courts to
hide behind strong Article III standing to rescue a weak jus tertii
20 7
position.
Second, both prongs of the test were applied with new rigor. The
close relationship prong was strengthened by a refusal to recognize a
merely hypothetical, abstract idea of an attorney-client relationship as
sufficient. Instead, an actual relationship with an actual client had to
be demonstrated. Similarly, the argued hindrance was not enough of
an obstacle, both because of practical evidence that the same type of
first parties were able to bring their own claims in similar cases, and,
alternatively, because of respect for the federal scheme and the
Court's suspicion that this claim was merely an attempt to circumvent
the state's process.
Third, for years it seemed that the Court would grant third-party
standing if the "underlying claim of third-party rights ...appear[ed]
to be substantively meritorious."20 8 Instead, the Kowalski Court
denied the jus tertii standing of two lawyers challenging the Michigan
practice that effectively denied the appointment of appellate counsel
for certain poor defendants despite the fact that the Court recognized
and enforced those same rights in Halbert v. Michigan,20 9 a case the
Court decided the very same Term as Kowalski.2 10 This demonstrates
205 See id. at 138-39 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
206 Id. at 140; see also FALLON ET AL., supra note 4, at 15 (5th ed. Supp. 2007)
(arguing that the burdens faced by the Kowalski defendants would have passed previous hindrance tests). For a good discussion of Justice Ginsburg's dissent see Stirrat,

supra note 5, at 1375-79.
207 Kowalski, 543 U.S. at 129 (majority opinion) ("[W]e shall assume the attorneys
have satisfied Article III and address the alternative threshold question whether they

have standing to raise the rights of others." (citing Rohrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co.,
526 U.S. 574, 585 (1999))).
208 FALLON ET AL., supra note 4, at 15 (5th ed. Supp. 2007) (arguing that Kowalski
represents a "clear departure" from the practice).

209
210

545 U.S. 605, 610 (2005).
See FALLON ET AL., supra note 4, at 17 (5th ed. Supp. 2008).
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dedication to the black-letter principle that standing is about the parties, not about the merits.
Kowalski, therefore, represents a significant break from past application of the two prongs of the analysis and a new commitment to the
general rule in jus tertii standing. By strengthening the test, Kowalski
demonstrated a commitment to the systemic purposes of standing law:
protecting separation of powers and ensuring structural adherence to
Article III's restrictions. It also reinforced a "private rights" view of
the function of courts-deciding concrete cases between truly adverse
parties who exercise ownership over their own claims.
C. Applying Kowalski to Singleton
To illustrate the change in third-party standing doctrine Kowalski
wrought, it is instructive to apply its rubric to Singleton's facts to determine the probable result if that decision were made today. As this
subpart demonstrates, the outcome would have been very different.
Singleton's facts, as laid out above, 211 were straightforward. Two
licensed abortion providers filed suit in federal court for injunctive
and declaratory relief against the Missouri statute restricting Medicare
funding only to such abortions that are "medically indicated." 21 2 Both
abortion providers claimed that they had performed abortion for otherwise eligible patients and would do so again, and that this law imper21 3
missibly interfered with the "doctor-patient" relationship.
As in Kowalski, the plaintiffs' Article III standing is clearly satisfied, so the modern Court considering the case could set that aside
and move on to jus tertii standing. On the close relationship prong,
the same hypothetical client concerns from Kowalski would apply to
Singleton's plaintiffs. The abortion providers did not bring these
claims on behalf of any particular patients who had been denied care
because of the statute. They did aver actual denials of payment, but
that is closely analogous to the relationship between the three indigent plaintiffs whose claims were dismissed because of the Younger
doctrine and the plaintiff attorneys in Kowalski. The fact that the
three indigent plaintiffs had been involved in the suit with the lawyers
previously was not enough to satisfy the close relationship prong. In
fact, the Court said that the attorneys had "no relationship at all" with
the relevant first parties. 2 14 Similarly, it is likely that the Singleton
plaintiffs' hypothetical relationships with Medicare-eligible women
211
212

See supra notes 151-53 and accompanying text.
Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 108-09 (1976) (plurality opinion).

213

See id. at 109.

214

Kowalski, 543 U.S. at 131.
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patients would be inadequate to satisfy the requirement for an
existing, actual relationship. This conclusion is confirmed by Chief
Justice Rehnquist's concluding remark that "'it would be a short step
from the.., grant of third-party standing in this case to a holding that
lawyers generally have third-party standing to bring... the claims of
future unascertained clients.'-

215

The Court will not grant jus tertii

standing merely because a recognized archetype of relationship can
be imagined, such as attorney-client (or doctor-patient). It requires
instead an actual relationship with the relevant first party.
The hindrance prong provides a starker contrast between the two
cases' results. The Singleton plurality put forward two obstacles: (1)
the woman's desire to remain anonymous and (2) the "imminent
mootness" of the individual woman's claims.2 1 6 As the plurality itself
all but conceded, these were not serious obstacles then, and they are
not now. Kowalski makes that clear. The majority in Kowalski looked
to practical judicial examples of similar first-party plaintiffs bringing
their own suits as conclusive evidence that there was no qualifying hindrance. That would almost certainly be the case here as well, where
courts even before Singleton allowed women to bring such suits under
pseudonyms 2 17 and after the pregnancy was over because it was a condition "'capable of repetition yet evading review.' "218 The first-party
women imagined in Singleton simply do not face the obstacles faced by
the indigent defendants imagined in Kowalski, who could not even
benefit from the assistance of counsel when bringing their suits. The
hindrance prong would therefore also fail, and the suit would be dismissed on both close relationship and hindrance grounds.2 1 9
This straightforward analysis avoids the missteps of allowing Article III standing to cloud the inquiry and ruling for the party that
would likely prevail on the merits. Instead, Singleton's plaintiffs would
have to satisfy third-party standing requirements on their own terms.
Under the facts given, it is highly unlikely they would do so.
The analysis above could, however, be altered if this situation represented an area where the Court had been "quite forgiving" on
215 Id. at 134 (first omission in original) (quoting Tesmer v. Granholm, 333 F.3d
683, 709 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc)). Compare this remark to Justice Powell's dissent
in Singleton, 428 U.S. at 130 n.7 (Powell,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
216 Singleton, 428 U.S. at 117 (plurality opinion).
217 See supra note 170.
218 Singleton, 428 U.S. at 117 (plurality opinion) (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 124-25 (1973)).
219 There are insufficient facts available to determine if there could have been a
Younger doctrine concern as well. On different facts, such as a simultaneous state
court case, this could have also been a problem for the plaintiffs.
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standing in the past. 220 These include First Amendment cases, as well
as those cases where the "'enforcement of the challenged restriction
against the litigantwould result indirectly in the violation of third par22
ties' rights.' ,,
1 While citing other cases as examples-Doe, Griswold,

Barrows-the Court did not include Singleton. Clearly Singleton is not a
First Amendment case. It is more difficult to determine whether the
facts place it within the second category. It is unclear, for example,
whether under the statute the woman was denied payment or abortion providers were. 222 Even assuming that the abortion providers
were denied payment, it is unclear if that would qualify as "enforcement" against the plaintiffs that "result[ed] indirectly in the violation
of third parties' rights." 223

The Court, applying this test in such

uncertain waters, might be swayed by two additional arguments weighing against granting standing. First, this is not a situation like that
present in Doe, Griswold, or Barrows where the law was not applied
against the first party such that their own standing would be in jeopardy. Women affected by the Missouri statute would certainly have
Article III standing to challenge it themselves. Second, the Court's
recent decision in Gonzales v. Carha't224 provides strong weight to the
proposition that the rights involved in abortion decisions do not
require special judicial consideration to sustain them. The Gonzales
Court explicitly rejected the facial challenge to the Partial Birth Abortion Ban, 225 stating that "[t]he latitude given facial challenges in the
First Amendment context is inapplicable here."22 6 These two factors
counsel strongly, perhaps definitively, against reducing the level of
rigor employed in evaluating the third-party standing of Singleton's
plaintiffs.
D. Lessons from the Kowalski Shift
After comparing Kowalski to Singleton, several important shifts,
both in doctrine and application, come into focus. First, by abandoning the first prong from the Powers test, the Court removed the
distraction in reasoning caused by dealing with the injury in fact question twice. This narrows the opportunities for courts to "hide the ball"
by using an element of Article III standing-which had to be estab220

Kowalski, 543 U.S. at 130.

221

Id. (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 510 (1975)).

222

See Singleton, 428 U.S. at 109 (plurality opinion).

223

Kowalski, 543 U.S. at 130.

224 127 S.Ct. 1610 (2007).
225 Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2006).
226 Gonzales, 127 S.Ct. at 1638-39.
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lished before the court reached prudential standing-along with the
other two prudential factors, to prop up an otherwise lacking jus tertii
claim. The injury in fact requirement is now cabined to its proper
2 27
place as gatekeeper of Article III standing.
Second, the Court applied much stronger versions of the two jus
tertii prongs. Kowalski rejected the "hypothetical relationship"
between the litigants and future possible poor defendants and focused
on whether there were any "existing" relationships that would be
affected. Hypothetical relationships were relied upon, at least in part,
in many of the Court's previous rulings allowing third-party standing,
including Singleton and other doctor-patient relationship cases.2 28
Similarly, the hindrance prong got some muscle. Despite the real and
challenging obstacles faced by indigent defendants attempting to
represent themselves (as laid out ably in the dissent by Justice Ginsberg), the majority held that there was no hindrance if the opportunity to appeal pro se remained open to the defendants. The Court
showed that, when conducting the hindrance test, a court must
examine the factual and legal impediments to the rightholder asserting his own claim. This is a clear departure from the level of scrutiny
at work in Singleton, where even the plurality didn't consider the obsta229
cles they put forward to be persuasive.
Third and finally, the Court showed that it means business when
it says that standing is about the parties and not about the underlying
merits of the third party's claim. Rejecting the claim of parties whose
same rights are vindicated later in the same Term sends that message
about as clearly as it can be sent.
V.

LESSONS AND APPLICATIONS TO CURRENT ABORTION
PROVIDER SUITS

Given the discussion above, what should an attorney do when
defending a state law against a challenge by an abortion provider seeking to assert the claims of his patients? There are several practical
points to consider when applying Kowalski as the standard instead of
Singleton.
First, counsel should be diligent in requiring the plaintiff to
assert or prove, at every stage of the litigation, the elements of Article
III and prudential standing. It may be a simple thing to plead around
the more rigorous Kowalski standards to defeat a 12(b) (6) motion to
dismiss, but more is required to survive a summary judgment motion,
227
228
229

See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text.
See Stirrat, supra note 5, at 1380-81, 1381 n.191.
See supra notes 168-73 and accompanying text.
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particularly now that hypothetical plaintiffs no longer satisfy the close
relationship prong. If a hypothetical attorney-client relationship was
found to be insufficient in the face of strong prior judicial recognition
of its importance, a strong argument can be made that the doctorpatient relationship should follow in the same mold.
Second, investigate the nature of the relationship to determine
whether it actually exists, and then whether it is close. Justice Powell's
dissent in Singleton raises doubts that a brief clinic visit actually establishes a doctor-patient relationship in the same way that the counseling and examinations did in Griswold. Was the only time the woman
saw that doctor when she was on the operating table for the abortion,
or was he a family physician? The Court has not given much guidance
on how such factors should be assessed, but the level of interaction
certainly appears relevant to determining whether a relationship actually exists and whether the abortion provider would be able to properly assert the interests of particular female patients.
Third, test the proffered hindrances against the Kowalski test, not
the Singleton test. Kowalski is a recent, majority opinion of the Court
on a substantially similar issue, while Singleton's hindrance analysis is
from a poorly reasoned plurality opinion in a factual situation that
would not arise again today.23 0 The hindrances raised in Singletonthe risk to the woman's privacy and imminent mootness-are simply
not strong enough to survive the level of scrutiny employed in Kowalski.23 1 The abortion provider must plead that the particular women

they seek to represent face some hindrance beyond the substantial
obstacles that confronted the indigent defendants trying to navigate
the murky waters of appellate review with no counsel in Kowalski. If
there are other women similarly placed who have brought suits challenging abortion regulations, that should be a powerful counterargument under the Kowalski approach.
Fourth, explore and expose divergent interests. Statutes which
give women rights of action in tort against abortion providers have
exposed a significant conflict of interest between the abortion provider's interests and the interests of a woman seeking an abortion. If
an abortion provider succeeded in a challenge to such a law, the
women affected (particularly the significant percentage of women
who have resultant medical complications from abortions) have lost a
right to recover damages against the doctor. "Right to know" laws
operate in a similar fashion, requiring doctors to provide women with
230
231

See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 169-73 and 216-19 and accompanying text.
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232
certain information before the abortion decision can be made.

Since the information is generally, though not exclusively, about the
possible risks of having an abortion, providing that information to
women deciding whether or not to have an abortion will have the tendency to decrease the number of abortions by a marginal number.
While women have an interest in making a well-informed medical
decision, the abortion provider has a financial interest in resisting
changes to their practices that will reduce the gross numbers of
patients they serve. This does not presuppose any dishonesty on the
part of the abortion provider, but merely the economics of information in this situation. Generally, the more abortions abortion providers perform, the more money they make. Divergent interests argue
powerfully against a close relationship existing between the abortion
provider-litigant and woman-rightholder, and any conflicts of interests
should be fully explored before the court allows an abortion provider,
or anyone else for that matter, to represent the interests of their
2 33
patients as third parties.
Finally, it may be an effective tactic to remind the judge that the
Supreme Court in Gonzales v. Carhart rejected special treatment of
234 It
abortion law when dealing with facial overbreadth challenges.
may be analogous to suggest that there are no special rules on abortion in any area of law, including standing.

232

See, e.g., Florida Medical Consent Law,

FLA.

STAT.

§ 766.103 (West Supp.

2008).
233 See generally Brief of Amicus Curiae of the Horatio R. Storer Foundation, Inc. in
Support of Petitioners, Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New England, 546 U.S.
320 (2006) (No. 04-1144) (arguing that abortion providers did not have third-party
standing to assert the rights of minors while challenging state regulation); Brief of
Amicus Curiae, Family Research Council in Support of Appellants, Planned
Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724 (8th Cir. 2008) (No. 05-3093)
(arguing that abortion providers did not have third-party standing to assert the rights
of women seeking abortions against state regulation); Brief of Amici Curiae SeventySix Oklahoma State Legislators, in Their Capacity as Individuals, in Support of
Defendants/Appellants Seeking Reversal of the District Court, Nova Health Sys. v.
Gandy, No. 02-5094 (10th Cir. Dec. 27, 2002) (arguing that abortion providers challenging imposition of tort remedies for injuries to minors from abortions on such
providers should not have third-party standing to assert the rights of their minor
patients). In the interest of full disclosure, I had the pleasure of working for Professor Teresa Collett, the author of the Ayotte and Gandy briefs, in the summer of 2007. I
did not work on either of these briefs. The remaining brief was authored by the
Alliance Defense Fund. I participated in the Blackstone Fellowship, a scholarship
program run by ADF, in the summer of 2007.
234

Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1638-39 (2007).
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CONCLUSION

Standing rules play a very important role in the federal system
and deserve careful attention in each civil action in federal court. The
content and application of those rules are critical to the preservation
of both systemic and institutional values found in both the Constitution and our common law heritage. Kowalski represents a major step
by the Court toward a serious application of third-party standing rules.
It stands in stark relief against the background of previous rulings that
appeared to ignore the general rule and allow third-party standing
whenever the plaintiff had strong Article III standing and a sympathetic claim. Singleton v. Wulffwas one such case. Requiring parties to
assert only those rights they hold themselves serves both the institutional and systemic purposes of federal standing doctrine: adverseness, ownership, concreteness, separation of powers, and structural
adherence to Article III.
With a properly limited Singleton and the revitalized doctrine of
third-party standing in Kowalski, a defense lawyer has the tools to challenge claims of third-party standing that go beyond the narrow scope
of what jus tertii doctrine properly allows into federal court. Judges
and lawyers would do well to reexamine their assumptions, specifically
in abortion provider cases, in light of Kowalski's new precedent and
the important purposes standing law serves in our federal system.
While it is certainly possible that abortion providers may continue to
represent the interests of their patients using jus tertii standing after
Kowalski, to do so they ought to be required to satisfy all the elements
of both general and third-party standing. If there is no actual close
relationship or hindrance within Kowalski's heightened understanding, then abortion providers ought to be left to sue on only their own
claims. If Kowalski is taken seriously, women would of course remain
free to assert or not assert their claims themselves, and without as high
a risk that the claims would instead be brought through the lens of
another party whose interests may or may not be aligned with their
own. Applying Kowalski with a close attention to factual detail and an
eye toward the systemic and institutional purposes of standing law will
go a long way to clearing up this "confused and confusing" area of
federal law.
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